Cross-Border Arbitrage And Free Trade by Trecartin, Ralph R. & Strieter, Jeffrey C.
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                  Volume 1, Number 2 
 15 
Cross-Border Arbitrage And Free Trade 
Ralph R. Trecartin, (E-mail: rtrecart@brockport.edu), State University of New York, Brockport 
Jeffrey C. Strieter, (E-mail: jstreets@rochester.rr.com), State University of New York, Brockport 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The following study presents a theory of cross-border arbitrage by consumers.  Competitive forces 
should explain how equilibrium prices would be set on each side of a border. Various trading 
partners have ratified numerous free-trade pacts. There is a need to investigate the success or 
failure of these agreements.  Because of the many non-tariff trade barriers, it is sometimes difficult 
to construct meaningful tests of the free-trade issues for products on an individualized basis.  Our 
comprehensive model of cross-border price variation develops an appropriate test.  A series of 
hypotheses on geographical arbitrage are presented. We also explain why some products may 
have larger price differences than others based on price sensitive arbitrage.  Our model may be 
used to measure the likelihood of undermining influences to free trade from any non-tariff barriers 
that continue to plague relations between trading partners.   
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
hroughout the ages, countries have sought ways to live more harmoniously with their neighbors.  
Negotiated trade agreements, designed with the intent of improving trade and commerce, are among 
the oldest accords between countries.  Today, over 200 regional trade agreements have been record-
ed with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (www.wto.org).  Most countries in the world are members of one or more regional trade agreement.  Recent-
ly there has been an increase in bilateral and multinational trade agreements.  Free trade pacts such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have been negotiated and implemented by a number of bilateral and 
multilateral parties.  The intent of these trade agreements is to encourage and facilitate free trade for at least a por-
tion of the commercial activities between the trading partners.  These mutually beneficial agreements are designed to 
provide gains to each of the signatory member countries.  A major issue with such an agreement is whether the goal 
of free and fair trade has been reached.  Have these trading pacts been successful, or do tariff and non-tariff barriers 
still hinder the unfettered exchange of goods and services? 
 
The ability of a trade agreement to ensure fair trade can be examined at different levels.  On a large scale, a 
negotiated trade agreement should permit trade between the signatory parties that is more free than trade would be 
without the agreement.  Once a trade agreement has been implemented, smaller issues, not completely defined and 
controlled by the trade agreement, arise.  An example of this is the prices of many goods and services offered for 
sale in border markets.  At the macro level, the trade agreement provides for the free exchange of goods and services 
between countries and markets.  It might be expected that differences in prices in cross border markets would be 
smaller than if there were no trade agreement.  At the micro level, there may be a number of influences affecting 
prices in cross border markets.  If there are no barriers to trade, pressure from consumers engaging in a form of 
cross-border arbitrage should ensure that prices are equal, or nearly so, after adjusting for exchange rates.  Product 
and price equality should be evident on both sides of an international border.  Just as differences in prices and prod-
uct offerings do exist between domestic competitors, moderate price differences are to be expected between cross-
border competitors as well. 
__________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
 
This study develops a theory that provides an upper and lower bound on these price differences.  Cross-
border price differences should fall within a predictable range.  The theory also explains the type of consumer beha-
vior that will likely be found in border regions.  The model developed from this theory can be used to explain why 
T 
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some price differences on either side of an international border are likely to persist.  If these price differences reside 
within the limits prescribed by the theory, they do not indicate violation of the principle of free and fair trade.  The 
model also allows for measurement of deviations from an expected free trade price range.  It also may be possible to 
explain why some products will be more closely aligned on the price dimension than others.  Because of the many 
non-tariff trade barriers, it is sometimes difficult to construct meaningful tests of free-trade issues for products and 
services on an individualized basis.  This study proposes a methodology for examining the likelihood that non-tariff 
barriers exist and continue to exert substantial economic effects on trade.  These barriers affect prices for individual 
products and also for wider categories of product.  
 
Not only can “price difference” tests be conducted for individual products, but portfolios of products and 
services can also be tested.  For example a test of overall trade efficiency can be constructed using a market basket 
of goods similar to that found in the Consumer Price Index (CPI).  From these tests inferences can be drawn con-
cerning the success or failure of the particular trade pact in place on a more generalized basis.  The model may be 
used to measure and target the undermining influences to free trade that are generated by the host of non-tariff bar-
riers that continue to plague our relations with trading partners.   
 
The paper is organized as follows:  In Section 2 a general review of free trade agreements is undertaken. 
Hindrances to free trade our specified and discussed in Section 3.  Cross-border consumer arbitrage is explained in 
Section 4. A series of hypotheses on geographical arbitrage are presented in Section 5. Price sensitive arbitrage re-
finements are introduced in Section 6. Finally a comprehensive model of cross-border price variation is suggested in 
Section 7.  The paper concludes with summary remarks in Section 8. 
 
2. Free Trade Agreements 
 
On January 1, 1989 a free trade agreement was implemented between the United States and Canada.  The 
agreement set out to eliminate most tariffs between the two countries over a 10-year phase out period ending in 1998 
(Agami, 1994).  The terms of this agreement, with modifications, were incorporated in the NAFTA.  The three 
member nations of NAFTA generally agreed to eliminate the tariff barriers by removing the taxes levied on imports 
and to eliminate the non-tariff barriers through the abolition of import and export restrictions such as quotas and cus-
tom user fees (Fatermi and Salvatore, 1994; Zangari, 1994).   
 
It is assumed that ten years would be sufficient for the development of an equilibrium environment for 
trade and trading practices.  This time frame should be adequate for the governmental agencies involved to sort out 
the inevitable differences that arise between the trading countries.  Consumers and businesses will have adjusted to 
the new economic conditions.  The ten year period should also be sufficient time for government officials and busi-
nesses to learn ways to exploit the weaknesses and limitations of any negotiated settlement.  It is under this scenario 
that we propose a model for testing the effects of any residual tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
 
Many other free trade agreements have also been established throughout the world.  The model presented in 
this paper should be useful in analyzing those pacts currently in place.  The NAFTA extended the reach of the origi-
nal Canada/U.S. agreement to include Mexico.  This agreement began its implementation phase on January 1, 1994.  
Most tariffs and non-tariff barriers were scheduled for elimination by the end of a ten-year phase-out period (Casa-
rio, 1996).   
 
In support of the general notion of free trade, proponents present empirical evidence that documents im-
pressive bilateral gains achieved after implementation of NAFTA.   Cosario (1996) demonstrates that both the Unit-
ed States and Canada reaped substantial benefits from expanded trade as a result of NAFTA. Annual trade between 
the United States and Canada stood at $300 billion in 1998 (Civil Engineering, 1999), up from $100 billion in 1993 
(Casario, 1996). 
 
Peach and Adkisson (2000) present the general view held by a majority of economists concerning the bene-
fits derived from free trade.  They specify that benefits primarily accrue from cross-border commerce and a general 
increase in economic activity by all parties involved.  Discussions concerning these benefits were undertaken at 
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some length when NAFTA was implemented.  Agami (1994) provides a good summary of the objectives outlined by 
the agreement. One of these objectives is, “to promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area.”  Roberts 
(2000) examines a number of arguments against free-trade pacts including: the loss of jobs argument, and the unfair 
playing field argument.  Free-trade detractors believe that free trade agreements are harmful and unfair because of 
non-tariff barriers and dumping activities. 
 
While supporters and detractors of such agreements continue to disagree on the effects of free trade, there 
have been few attempts to actually measure the degree or level of  “free” trade on any basis other than on an aggre-
gate basis.  Anderson and O’Dowd (1999) present the justification for focusing on border regions in this quest.  
They state that borders “are particularly revealing places for social research, especially in the present era of acce-
lerated globalization (593).  They point out that border regions are uniquely suited for investigation of cross-border 
arbitrage as “price advantages lurch from one side of the border to the other (594).”   
 
Ohmae (1990) argues that the world is moving toward a borderless global economy.  If the globalization of 
commerce has taken effect, or even if free trade is in place between some trading partners, then there should be a 
continual flow of goods and services across participating national borders.  In this setting, price and quality differ-
ences will be relatively small assuming competition is allowed to flourish without restraint. If trade fairness issues 
are not addressed, many obstacles will exist to prevent product equality along the dimensions of differentiation and 
price.  These, in turn, have a direct impact on the amount of arbitrage activity undertaken by consumers.   
 
Thus, our motivation for examining free trade in the context of border regions comes from Anderson and 
O’Dowd (1999).  Peach and Adkisson (2000) examine economic activity on the American side of the United States 
– Mexico Border.  In contrast we seek to generalize the issue to the theoretical level.  We specify a model and a se-
ries of tests that can be applied to any border region. Future research can then apply the theory in a more localized 
context.   
 
3. Hindrances to Free Trade 
 
Anderson and O’Dowd (1999) list numerous hindrances to trade including: language differences, customs 
procedures, legal and regulatory variation, and political instability and conflict.  Despite economic integration be-
tween nations throughout the world, historical trade patterns continue to permeate global commerce.  Cultural and 
societal differences between nations affect product tastes and needs (Cateora and Graham, 2000).  Regulations and 
standards set at the federal and regional layers of government affect practically all goods and services that are pro-
duced and sold (Nichols and Taylor, 1995).  In some instances, regulations are established that unintentionally affect 
free trade (Skud, 1996).  Other times, governments attempt to bolster their trade terms through clever legislative acts 
that create barriers to imports even though tariffs have been reduced or eliminated (Hill, 2000). 
 
Skud (1996) discusses customs requirements that are redundant, complex and cause costly time delays for 
the importation and transportation of goods.  To some extent this type of non-tariff barrier will drive away would be 
competitors, allowing higher prices to be charged by domestic firms.  Nichols and Taylor (1995) outline seven 
common non-tariff barriers.  These include:  1) government support of domestic firms through purchase contracts 
and subsidies, 2) customs policies, 3) standards, 4) import controls, 5) non-tariff import charges, 6) foreign direct 
investment restrictions, and 7) weak infrastructure.  
 
Two of the most successful trading partners in economic history are Canada and the United States. A list of 
documented hindrances to trade between these partners are given here as a sample of the hindrances to trade that are 
likely to be found between other trading partners as well. 
 
One of the most obvious nuisances to free trade between Canada and United States results from different 
measurement systems.  While the English measurement system dominates in the United States, the metric system is 
utilized throughout Canada.  As a result, prepackaged goods in the United States and Canada typically contain dif-
ferent amounts or volumes of product.  In turn, the cost differential on identical prepackaged goods in both countries 
may be partially attributable to the resulting differences in quantity. 
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Differences in currency value may impair free trade between countries (Talaski, 2000).  For example, if the 
exchange rate between the United States dollar and the Canadian dollar hovers around US$1.00 – C$1.50 for a pe-
riod of time, and then moves to an exchange rate of US$1.00 – C$1.70, holders of United States dollars will have a 
greater degree of purchasing power in Canada than previously encountered.  As the relative currency values change 
the attitudes and behaviors of consumers and business entities will also change, though differently on each side of 
the border. 
 
Market size is another critical difference that curtails free trade between Canada and the United States.  Ac-
cording to recent statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada, America has roughly 283.5 million 
residents while Canada has around 30.5 million residents.  Due to population differences, there are thousands more 
retail outlets in the United States than in Canada.  In turn, Canadian sales representatives are not able to generate 
sales volumes as large as those in the United States.  As the Canadian volumes are smaller, Canadian sales vendors 
are sometimes prohibited from carrying more lines of goods (Agency Sales, 2000). 
 
Special measures are taken by governments to safeguard select industries.  For example, Canada and the 
United States impose sanitary and phytosanitary regulations to protect animals, people and plants from harmful ad-
ditives, contaminants, disease-causing organisms and toxins.  Exemplifying these laws, the United States recently 
prohibited potatoes from Prince Edward Island after learning of a harmful fungus found in a P.E.I. potato field 
(Tempers Flare in Potato Dispute, 2001).  Another barrier that curtails the free trade of agricultural products are 
government control boards that influence prices.  Recently the World Trade Organization (WTO) censured Canada 
for enforcing a dairy industry supply management scheme that shielded the Canadian dairy market from more effi-
cient foreign producers (Jack, 2000).  
 
Foreign relations with nations overseas affect free trade between Canada and the United States.  Illustrating 
differences in foreign policy, Canada maintains diplomatic relations with Cuba and Iran, while the United States 
does not.  Because Canada holds diplomatic relations with such countries, Canadian firms have a larger pool in 
which to procure commodities, including Cuban sugar and Iranian oil (Canada-Cuba Trade and Investment; Salam 
Iran).  This reduces the pressure on prices for some commodities in Canada. 
 
Product health warnings are another example of regulations that impair free trade, though perhaps rightly 
so.  While authorities in the United States only require a sedate warning label on cigarettes, Canadian authorities re-
quire extraordinarily graphic warning labels that visually demonstrate the negative effects of smoking (New Ciga-
rette Pack Warning Labels Appear, 2000).  As the Canadian labels make a much stronger statement to smokers than 
American labels, cigarette sales in Canada may be at a disadvantage to American cigarette sales. 
 
Differences in regulations between Canada and the United States at the provincial and state levels also af-
fect free trade between the two countries.  Laws pertaining to bottle deposits exemplify the effects of provincial/state 
level regulations on prices.  While bottle deposits are not required for plastic soda bottles in Ontario for example, 
they are required in New York increasing the cost of carbonated beverages (Bottle Bill, 2001).  Different age limits 
on the purchase of alcohol and tobacco products are other examples of regulations that hinder free trade.  In Ontario, 
a consumer must be 19 to purchase alcohol and tobacco, while in New York, a consumer must be 21 to purchase al-
cohol and 18 to purchase tobacco (Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse, 2001). 
 
4. Cross-border Consumer Arbitrage 
 
If free trade exists between countries we should see substantial amounts of consumer activity that span both 
sides of a border region.  Whenever differences exist in prices, and product differentiation there is an incentive for 
consumers to undertake cross-border commercial activities.  These differences may be caused by hindrances to trade 
some of which have been outlined here.  Whatever the reason for a price difference, arbitrage activities can be ex-
pected.  It is not unusual to hear about border smuggling operations, when large price differences exist.  If trade is 
legal, then arbitrage activities will be more subtle in nature; however, they will not be eliminated. It is these arbi-
trage activities that are necessary to bring trade into equilibrium on either side of a border. 
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Pure arbitrage in any market can be defined as the means to earn a risk less profit.  A particular security, 
commodity or other product is purchased in one market and simultaneously sold in another.  In this way arbitrage is 
a useful mechanism for capturing profits as a result of differences in price.  Supply and demand will be affected by 
this arbitrage activity putting positive price pressure on the product being purchased while putting negative pressure 
on the price of the product being sold.  Pure arbitrage tends to push prices to equilibrium between geographically 
distinct markets if no structural inefficiencies are at work to perpetuate the inequality. 
 
What is cross border consumer arbitrage?  This type of arbitrage occurs when consumers travel across the 
border into the neighboring town, city, or region for the purpose of purchasing products or services.  Consumer arbi-
trage is not pure arbitrage, but in general is a low risk activity if no laws are broken.  Consumer arbitrage offers con-
siderable benefits to those who engage in this type of behavior.  Goods are purchased at the best price on either side 
of the border and then consumed over time.  This is in contrast to the simultaneous sale of the product under pure 
arbitrage.  Nevertheless, supply and demand imbalances will occur on either side of the border if prices consistently 
deviate from cross border alternatives.  Consumers will trade the opportunity cost of time and some transportation 
cost or other transactions costs for the opportunity to purchase goods at lower prices or at higher quality.  Business 
establishments that do not account for this consumer behavior will be left with slowly moving inventories on the one 
hand, or rapidly moving inventories but lost potential profits on the other.   
 
An interesting example of arbitrage activities that benefit consumers at the expense of governmental reve-
nues is the often-present tollbooth between countries as will be found at most US/Canadian border posts.  One 
rightly assumes that tollbooths are a type of tariff, but in this context paying a reduced toll can reduce the pain of 
travel and increase overall economic utility. Tolls are usually set at predetermined levels and changed relatively in-
frequently.  At the same time exchange rates are constantly fluctuating.  It is thus possible for one who must com-
mute from one country to another on a regular basis anyway, to reduce the overall level of tolls paid.  This may be 
done by always paying the toll with the currency that best captures the deviation from the toll price ratio.  If the ex-
change rate is C$1.50 = US$1.00 and the commuter has the choice of paying either $3.75CA or $2.25US (a ratio of 
1.67 vs. exchange ratio of 1.50) then the commuter should always pay in US dollars saving $0.50 per round trip 
($3.75CA/1.5 = $2.50 US vs. 2.25US toll) or about $125 per average work year.   
 
In the following sections we address the geographical issue of arbitrage.  We answer the question of when 
arbitrage will occur, and where arbitrage will likely occur.  The discussion of geographical arbitrage reveals implica-
tions regarding the efficiency of free-trade pacts. 
 
5. Geographical Arbitrage 
 
We start our discussion in this section with the following general hypothesis followed by a series of more 
specific hypotheses and discussion.  Each hypothesis builds upon the previous one in the quest to understand cross-
border price differences. 
General HO:  With Free and Fair Trade, Identical Product Offerings Will Be Available On Both Sides of the 
Border at Identical Prices. 
 
If there are statistically significantly deviations in price between the two sides of a border, then the general 
hypothesis is rejected.  This may imply that trade is not free or fair.  Or it may be that there are alternative explana-
tions possible.  These explanations will be explored below. 
 
As can be seen in the example presented in figure 1, under perfect price equality at a Canadian/US ex-
change rate of CA$1.50 = US$1.00 a uniform product selling for $10 US should sell for $15 CA.  If this product 
were selling at $14.99 CA it is not likely that consumers would pay much attention to the exchange rate adjusted 
price difference.  But if the product were selling for $10.99CA, a larger percentage of consumers than normal could 
be expected to purchase the product on the Canadian side of the border. 
 
Figure 1. 
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If the border in the above example were closed to consumer travel, we would expect price differences to 
persist.  If consumers were allowed to travel, but a 20% tariff were in place for all goods brought into the US, we 
would also expect the price difference to persist.  In general as long as certain tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
are in place, one would expect to find larger differences in price across borders.  If no barriers to trade exist, large 
price differences should eventually evaporate. 
 
If the general hypothesis above is tested statistically and rejected, does this mean that unfair barriers to 
trade exist?  Not necessarily.  In almost any domestic market, price differences for identical products can be found.  
This leads to our first specific hypothesis.   
 
HO1:  Identical Domestic Product Offerings Between Two Adjacent Retail Establishments Will Have No Varia-
tion in Price.   
 
Rejection of this hypothesis can be demonstrated on a consistent basis if price differences are calibrated on 
a fairly fine level.  For example, it is normal to see two gas stations located at the same intersection with a several 
cent difference in gasoline prices.  These price differences often persist for months or years on end. 
 
It is normal to assume some variation in prices and price differences through time. What is the cut off point 
between normal variation and differences in price induced by barriers to trade?  One approach to measuring the in-
cidence of “free trade” would be to measure prices on either side of a border, and assume that barriers to trade exist 
unless identical product offerings are found at identical prices.  This is a worthy approach, and worth an empirical 
investigation.  But, we would not expect identical prices in the domestic setting for a variety of reasons.  So, why 
should we expect uniform prices and product offerings across borders? 
 
In the domestic setting many reasons for differences in price can be listed that do not preclude persistent 
price differences over time.  These include:  location, convenience, impulse purchases, necessities, low priced items, 
near substitutes, inferior goods, human loyalty, packaging, appearance, ambiance and setting among others.  If the 
product offering in a specific market is not identical we know that price differences will occur.  Product differentia-
tion has been documented as a useful marketing strategy in the pursuit of higher prices and larger margins. 
 
Different pricing strategies could be used to explain persistent differences.  Some businesses may use one 
product as a loss leader to attract customers for the purchase of other products.  One store may use a “low turnover, 
high markup” strategy while another selling the same line of products may opt for the “high turnover, low markup 
approach.  The gas station example above is a prime example.  One station makes their profit on volume capturing a 
majority of the local customers.  The other station will capture overflow customers who are pressed for time, and 
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unwilling to wait in line at the pump.  The price differences will persist because both businesses are successfully 
making profits using different pricing strategies.   
 
Price differences may exist because of poor management.  We would expect that a business selling prod-
ucts at a loss would eventually fail.  But, if prices were compared before the business failure date, price differences 
would influence the statistical sample.  In a cross border situation, we would assume that poor management would 
even out on each side of the border in any comprehensive sample, though other systematic differences would con-
tinue to be captured.     
 
Competitive products across borders are more likely if free and fair trade exists.  In a competitive cross 
border market two possibilities exist: 
 
1. Prices and product offerings will be driven into equilibrium on either side of the border.  Product offerings 
will be very similar if not identical. 
2. For a particular product category, offerings will migrate to one side of the border or the other because of 
geographical advantages, such as population, demand, and other market conditions. 
 
In summary, one would expect the rejection of HO1.  Price differences are to be expected between local 
competitors.  The real value gained from the rejection of the hypothesis, is the justification provided for the calcula-
tion of a range of prices on identical products.  Once the normal range is established in the domestic setting, then it 
becomes helpful to project this range onto international comparisons. HO2, is useful in this regard. 
 
HO2:  Identical Domestic Product Offerings Between Two Adjacent Retail Establishments Will Not Diverge 
From Each Other Beyond Some Percentage Difference (Delta). 
 
Pa = Pb +/-                    (1) 
 
Pa = Price of firm a’s product 
Pb = Price of firm b’s product 
 = Price difference between “a” and “b” 
 
In the gas station example above, the normal price difference for a gallon of gas at $1.55 vs. $1.57 per gal-
lon would be $0.02.  Since price changes between the two gas stations may not be simultaneously executed, and be-
cause the variation in prices over time may not be constant, it would be possible to use the standard deviation of 
price differences to help determine an appropriate delta.  In this case we could assume a higher delta for our stan-
dard, (delta = $0.03 or about 2% price difference). 
 
Rejection of HO2 for any given delta simply implies that a wider distribution of price bounds is necessary 
in order to capture the free trade upper and lower limits on price that can be expected in a setting of domestic com-
petition.  HO3 adds an additional factor to the consideration of what delta should be.  
 
HO3:  The Normal Delta Will Not Be Affected by Geographical Distance Between Firms. 
 
Rejection of this hypothesis is to be expected because of various types of “transactions costs.”  It takes 
more time, and is more expensive to drive across town to make a purchase.  Thus some businesses will charge high-
er prices but capture revenues based on convenience or the “reduced transactions cost” to the consumer.  Transac-
tion costs can be real (feed the parking meter) or psychological (it is too hot to get a better price). 
 
By including distance in the analysis of an acceptable range of prices between competitors, it is possible to 
establish adjustable free trade bounds that more accurately capture normal price variation.  Price differences be-
tween firms in adjacent domestic cities can be expected to be larger than differences between firms in more close 
proximity.  When venturing to analyze price differences on either side of a border, the distance adjusted domestic 
delta needs to be considered.  
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In an environment of free trade such as between states in the U.S, price differences between cities on each 
side of a state border will be bounded by  + . 
 
=Differences in state taxes and regulations. 
 
If one state has a 6% sales tax while the other a 5% sales tax, cross “state” border arbitrage is expected to 
keep product prices within a comparable range, but not identical. 
 
Pa = Pb +/- (+ )                   (2) 
 
HO4:  Given Adjacent Cities on Either Side of a Country Border, Prices Will Diverge at Most by (+ ). 
 
Rejection of this hypothesis provides a somewhat stronger indication of trade barriers than rejection of the 
original general hypothesis above.  By allowing prices to diverge within a particular bound, normally occurring 
price differences are not used to prejudice a judgment of fairness.  
 
In an empirical study on a particular product it would be necessary to establish the normal δ in percentage 
terms.  Special care would be necessary to determine the geographical distance between border towns and apply that 
distance in one or more domestic marketplaces when calculating .  When estimating actual tax differences be-
tween the two countries may be used.  An alternative approach is to estimate a domestic ε between two or more do-
mestic cities on either side of a state border, and then simply apply this  in the international setting.   
 
For some products an actual tax ε estimation procedure may be misleading.  For example taxes applied to 
the purchase of an automobile may be very different between two states or countries, but the procedures for registra-
tion may require the domestic tax rate to be applied no matter where the purchase took place.  Smaller consumer 
products may not face this problem. 
 
If non-tariff barriers are exerting an undue influence on international trade it is likely that product prices 
will diverge by more than (+ ).  By testing HO4, a rejection indicates some non-tariff barriers are probably at 
work. 
 
In order to fully explain cross-border arbitrage, it may be useful to compare prices on either side of a border 
with striations of geographical distance.  By examining price differences immediately next to the border on each 
side, and then comparing these differences to prices set at a considerable distance from the border on each side, we 
can better evaluate the success or failure of consumer arbitrage to drive prices in a localized geographical equili-
brium.   
 
HO5:  Geographical distance between a city and a border will have no effect on price differences. 
 
One would expect that the farther a city is located geographically from the border, the wider the divergence 
in price allowed to compensate for transactions costs of arbitrage such as transportation costs and information bar-
riers (where to shop on the other side of the border).  This hypothesis is similar to HO3 above.  Whereas HO3 ex-
amines price differences between domestic firms separated by distance, HO5 examines the effect of geographical 
distance on product prices on either side of a border.   
 
One would assume that consumers would be more apt to make purchases on the other side of the border if 
the distance is small.  Thus a city close to the border should exhibit more price similarity with prices on the other 
side of the border, then with a city that is some distance “inland.”  The city not exposed to border arbitrage, is likely 
to have less pressure on prices from this type of activity. 
 
6. Price Sensitive Arbitrage 
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Given the above discussion on geographical arbitrage we assume that there may be moderate if not substan-
tial price differences between identical products sold on different sides of an international border.  If these prices fall 
within a reasonable upper and lower bound we cannot reject the notion of free and fair trade.  But, if these prices fall 
outside this bound we have evidence to support the “barriers to trade” argument. 
 
Up to this point we have not suggested whether the bounds are uniform across products, or whether the 
bounds vary from product to product in any sort of systematic fashion.  It is even possible that price variation is ran-
dom.  To test this issue we suggest the following general hypothesis. 
 
General HO:  All products will exhibit an identical band of price variation, i.e. All product prices will be 
bounded by the same % difference 
 
Four outcome scenarios are likely when this hypothesis is tested.  The first of these scenarios assumes that 
the hypothesis cannot be rejected.  The other three scenarios each contribute to an explanation of price variation that 
may be found even in the event of free and fair trade.  These scenarios are listed here: 
 
1. Constant percentage price range across products. 
2. Linear percentage differences in price - low to high.   
3. Linear percentage differences in price - high to low.   
4. Curvilinear differences in price. 
 
If the general hypothesis cannot be rejected, it then becomes fairly easy to construct generalized tests of 
free trade efficiency across a portfolio of products.  If a substantial percentage of items in the portfolio demonstrate 
prices that fall outside the (+ ) bound, it is reasonable to conclude that some barriers to trade are hurting trade effi-
ciency. 
 
If scenario two turns out to be more accurate, low price products will exhibit low percentage differences, 
and high priced products will exhibit high percentage differences.  If scenario three represents reality, the reverse is 
true.  High price products will exhibit low percentage differences, and low priced products will exhibit high percen-
tage differences. 
 
We suggest that scenario four is the most likely if free trade agreements are in place and yet non-tariff bar-
riers are at work.  Low priced products will have large percentage differences on either side of a border, because 
consumers will not be bothered on average to shop for the best price when the absolute price difference is lower than 
the real or perceived transaction cost of crossing the border.  By estimating a (+ ) bound for low priced products in 
the domestic setting it is then possible to test whether the hassles of cross border shopping are increasing price dif-
ferences. One criticism of this suggestion is that consumers may still benefit by crossing the border to purchase 
many small priced items at one time, thus diluting the larger percentage price difference argument. 
 
Under the fourth scenario, moderately priced items will exhibit the smallest percentage price differences, 
because consumer arbitrage becomes an economical activity.  Consumers will push prices close to or within the  (+ 
) bound as supply and demand are equalized by competitive forces.   
 
High priced items, provide the incentive for consumer arbitrage, but also provide larger incentives for mer-
chants and governments to enter into protectionist activities.  Thus it may be expected that these items again will ex-
hibit price differences that are larger in percentage terms than for those found on medium priced merchandise.  
 
Whether the (+ ) bound in the domestic setting is higher for high priced items is not known.  It is likely 
that issues of trust, reliability, and reputation become much more important with the increased monetary outlay for 
these products.  These issues in turn provide for important factors in product differentiation and should enable larger 
price differences between competitors.  Because the remedy for any breach of trust is likely to be more complicated 
in international trade, it is not unreasonable to assume that high priced items will fall substantially outside of the 
domestic (+ ) bound.  Figure 2 graphically portrays this scenario.   
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                  Volume 1, Number 2 
 24 
 
7. Cross Border Model  
 
Halat and Trecartin (2001) examine price differences for a sample of products in the cities of Niagara Falls, 
Canada and Niagara Falls, New York.  Table 1 provides a list of these differences after adjusting for exchange rates. 
For some products, including flour, off-brand jeans and dog food, the differences between Canadian and American 
prices are small.  The local newspapers were priced the same in both market places.  On the other hand, significant 
price differences are found for Coca-Cola, fuel oil, eyeglasses and cigarettes.  We conclude that price equilibrium in 
the cross border markets does exist for some products and does not exist for other products.   
 
The following model is proposed as a means to explain price differences across borders.  The model pre-
dicts that normal price variation in the domestic market will contribute information on the magnitude of price differ-
ences across borders.  The sign of this variable is expected to be positive.  Tax differences and geographical distance 
should also positively impact the cross border price range.  The product price level may be positively or negatively 
related to cross border price differences in a linear fashion as is captured by equation (3).  Or, as in equation (4) cur-
vilinear price differences may be captured by the use of dummy variables for low and moderate product price seg-
ments. 
 
The following model is proposed as a means to explain price differences across borders.  The model pre-
dicts that normal price variation in the domestic market will contribute information on the magnitude of price differ-
ences across borders.  The sign of this variable is expected to be positive.  Tax differences and geographical distance 
should also positively impact the cross border price range.  The product price level may be positively or negatively 
related to cross border price differences in a linear fashion as is captured by equation (3).  Or, as in equation (4) cur-
vilinear price differences may be captured by the use of dummy variables for low and moderate product price seg-
ments. 
Figure 2 
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Table 1 
Comparative Overview of the Market Baskets 
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Item Used In The Study 
Origin: Cana-
dian Market 
Basket 
Origin: 
American 
Market Basket 
Product Cost: 
Canadian 
Market Basket 
Product Cost: 
American 
Market Basket 
Difference 
Between  
Canadian & 
American Costs 
      
Robin Hood All Purpose Flour Canada U.S.A. 1.98 1.89 5% 
Lean Ground Beef (1 Kg) n/a n/a 2.92 2.49 15% 
2% Milk Canada U.S.A. 1.68 1.51 10% 
Red Delicious Apples (1 Kg) U.S.A. U.S.A. 1.45 0.99 32% 
Coca-Cola (2 Liters) Canada U.S.A. 0.78 1.50 -92% 
Sugar Canada U.S.A. 1.27 2.39 -88% 
Mc Donalds "Big Mac" Sandwich Canada U.S.A. 1.92 2.15 -12% 
Budweiser 6-Pack Canada U.S.A. 6.18 4.99 19% 
Hampton Inn (1 Night Stay) Canada U.S.A. 48.95 59.00 -21% 
Fuel Oil n/a n/a 0.952 1.499 -57% 
Designed Floor Covering U.S.A. U.S.A. 99.70 79.99 20% 
White Wall Clock U.S.A. U.S.A. 7.31 5.49 25% 
Fruit of the Loom Sweatpants Mexico Mexico 7.97 6.99 12% 
Off-brand Jeans (Size 10) China Mexico 13.27 12.99 2% 
Men's Off-brand Sneakers (Size 10) China China 26.58 19.99 25% 
2001 Buick LeSabre Custom Sedan U.S.A. U.S.A. 21350.70 24762.00 -16% 
2 Hour Train Ride Canada U.S.A. 18.49 26.00 -41% 
Hydrogen Peroxide (500ml) Canada U.S.A. 0.62 0.44 29% 
Eyeglasses (1.25x strength) China U.S.A. 9.29 17.99 -94% 
RCA 13" Color Television Thailand Thailand 132.94 119.99 10% 
Dog Food Canada U.S.A. 5.50 4.99 9% 
Off-brand Basketball China Malaysia 3.30 4.99 -51% 
Kodak Gold 35mm film, 24-exposure U.S.A. U.S.A. 2.92 1.98 32% 
Monopoly Game U.S.A. U.S.A. 12.61 7.88 38% 
Blockbuster Video, 24 hour rental Canada U.S.A. 3.66 4.06 -11% 
Golden Books, "Math 1-2" U.S.A. U.S.A. 3.16 2.09 34% 
Local Newspaper Canada U.S.A. 0.50 0.50 0% 
Local Mail, 1 Letter Canada U.S.A. 0.31 0.34 -10% 
Payphone, Local Call Canada U.S.A. 0.17 0.25 -47% 
"Wheel of Fortune," Computer Game U.S.A. U.S.A. 23.26 29.95 -29% 
Cigarettes (20-pack) Canada U.S.A. 2.41 4.96 -106% 
Head & Shoulders Shampoo U.S.A. U.S.A. 3.42 2.69 21% 
Shirt Cleaning Canada U.S.A. 2.33 1.20 48% 
Writing Tablet (100 Sheets) Canada Indonesia 0.99 1.49 -51% 
 
 
PPD = + X1 + X2 +DX3 + PX4 +                (3) 
 
PPD = Price Percentage Difference 
= Domestic Price Difference 
= State or Country Tax Difference 
D= Distance from Border 
P = Product Price Level 
= Residual 
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PPD = + X1 + X2 +DX3 + LPX4 + MPX5 +               (4) 
 
LP = Low Price Dummy 
MP = Moderate Price Dummy 
 
In the discussion of price sensitive arbitrage it was suggested that low and high price level products would 
both have larger percentage price differences than moderate price level products.   If low price level products have 
higher percentage price differences than moderately priced products, than LPX4 in the model will have a statistically 
significant positive sign.  The variable MPX5 would be expected to have an insignificant role in the model or alter-
natively to exhibit a significant and negative sign according to the theory presented earlier.  The intercept captures 
the effect of high price products.  If barriers to trade are systematically causing prices to diverge in border com-
merce, these effects will be captured in the residuals of the model. 
 
8. Implications 
 
Where there is no free trade, it is typical to find large price differences for similar products on either side of 
an international border.  Where free trade does exist, there are much smaller price differences.  This paper posits 
cross border arbitrage as a valid tool for examining these differences.  The magnitude of price differences can be 
used as a surrogate measure for the effectiveness of free trade. 
 
This paper develops a theoretical model of cross border arbitrage.  The model can be used to determine a 
free-trade range of prices.  If the price differences are small (and therefore within the free-trade range), one may as-
sume that free trade is effective. When the price differences are large (outside the free-trade range), we can conclude 
that barriers to free trade may exist.  The model contains variables that explain the free trade range of prices.  The 
variables include domestic price difference, state or country tax difference, distance from border and product price 
level.   
 
Free trade agreements are traditionally structured and examined on a macro basis.  Once implemented, the 
agreements are interpreted and utilized on a micro basis by trade officials, businesses and consumers.  As an indica-
tor of free trade effectiveness, cross border arbitrage is useful for measuring the price differences between two coun-
tries.  Countries should be interested in measuring this effectiveness for two reasons: 
 
1. Countries individually need to measure and monitor the affect free trade agreements have on its citizens.  In 
those situations where unanticipated, negative impacts do occur, governments must intercede to minimize 
these impacts on select markets. 
2. When the negative impacts of an agreement become significant, they become the driving force to modify 
the current agreement or negotiate a new agreement between the two partners.   
 
9. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
1. The hypothesized model should be tested empirically with data gathered from appropriate cross border 
geographic settings. 
2. Once the model has been tested, further development might result in the ability to examine differences in 
prices based upon shopping behavior and purchase importance.   
3. The model may also be useful in developing more understanding of the causal behavior of illegal forms of 
commerce (smuggling), which develop as a result of trade agreements. 
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